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Once President Barack Obama and Democrats in Congress 
have passed a health care reform 
bill, conservative groups are 
likely to challenge parts of it as 
unconstitutional, arguing that it 
oversteps Congress’s powers. A 
key target will be the individual 
mandate, which is designed to 
coax uninsured persons into 
purchasing insurance. 
The term “individual mandate” 
is misleading for two reasons. 
First, the law would not actually 
require all individuals to purchase 
insurance. The mandate would not 
apply to dependents, persons re-
ceiving Medicare or Medicaid, 
military families, persons living 
overseas, persons with religious 
objections, or persons who already 
get health insurance from their 
employers under a qualified plan.
Second, it is not actually a man-
date. It is a tax, which people 
would not have to pay if they 
purchased health insurance. The 
House bill imposes a tax of 2.5% 
on adjusted gross income if a tax-
payer is not part of a qualified 
health insurance program. The 
Senate bill imposes what is called 
an “excise tax” — a tax on trans-
actions or events — or a “penalty 
tax” — a tax for failing to do 
something (e.g., filing your tax 
return promptly). The tax is lev-
ied for each month that an indi-
vidual fails to pay premiums into 
a qualified health plan. 
Congress has the power to pass 
legislation that falls within any 
of its powers enumerated in the 
Constitution. There are two ob-
vious sources of congressional 
power. The first, described in the 
General Welfare Clause, is the pow-
er “to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts and excises, to pay the 
debts and provide for the com-
mon defence and general welfare 
of the United States.” The second, 
laid out in the Commerce Clause, 
is the power “to regulate com-
merce . . . among the several 
states.”
The individual mandate is a 
tax. Does it serve the general wel-
fare? The constitutional test is 
whether Congress could reason-
ably conclude that its taxing and 
spending programs promote the 
general welfare of the country.1 
This test is easily satisfied. The 
new health care reform bill in-
sures more people and prevents 
them from being denied insur-
ance coverage because of preex-
isting conditions. Successful re-
form requires that uninsured 
persons — most of whom are 
younger and healthier than aver-
age — join the national risk pool; 
this will help to lower the costs 
of health insurance premiums na-
tionally. 
Taxing uninsured people helps 
to pay for the costs of the new 
regulations. The tax gives unin-
sured people a choice. If they stay 
out of the risk pool, they effec-
tively raise other people’s insur-
ance costs, and Congress taxes 
them to recoup some of the costs. 
If they join the risk pool, they do 
not have to pay the tax. A good 
analogy would be a tax on pollut-
ers who fail to install pollution-
control equipment: they can pay 
the tax or install the equipment.
Because the textual argument 
for Congress’s authority under the 
General Welfare Clause is obvious 
and powerful, opponents have 
tried to argue that the tax is un-
constitutional because it is a “di-
rect” tax. Under the Constitution, 
“direct” taxes must be apportioned 
to state population. That is, if 
State A has twice as many peo-
ple as State B, the amount of rev-
enue collected from State A must 
be twice that collected from State 
B. Like most federal taxes, the in-
dividual mandate is not appor-
tioned to state population. 
The classic examples of direct 
taxes are taxes on real estate and 
capitation or “head” taxes on the 
general population, under which 
people are taxed no matter what 
they do. In one of the Supreme 
Court’s first cases, Hylton v. Unit-
ed States, Justice William Paterson 
held that if there is any doubt, 
taxes should be classified as in-
direct rather than direct.2 
The individual mandate is not 
a direct tax. The House’s version 
is a tax on income. Under the Six-
teenth Amendment, income taxes 
do not have to be apportioned, 
regardless of the source of the 
income. The Senate’s version is an 
excise or penalty tax. It is neither 
a tax on real estate nor a general 
tax on individuals. It is a tax on 
events: individuals who are not 
exempted are taxed for each month 
they do not pay premiums to a 
qualified plan. 
If the individual mandate falls 
within Congress’s power to tax 
and spend, no other constitution-
al authority is necessary. However, 
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Congress also has the power to 
impose the tax under the Com-
merce Clause. The test in this case 
is whether Congress could reason-
ably conclude that the economic 
activity it regulates has a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce 
when all individual instances of 
the regulated activity are added 
together. The Supreme Court says 
that economic activities include 
buying and selling, borrowing 
money, agriculture, services, man-
ufacturing, and consumption.
Even if an activity is local and 
not economic, Congress can reg-
ulate it if it reasonably believes 
that doing so is necessary to make 
its regulation of commerce effec-
tive.3 (Under the Constitution, 
Congress has the power to make 
all regulations that are “necessary 
and proper” for carrying out its 
enumerated powers.) 
In 1942, the Supreme Court 
held that Congress could regu-
late wheat grown for home con-
sumption as part of a general 
regulation of farm production.4 
People who grew wheat at home 
substituted it for wheat products 
they would otherwise purchase 
in the market; cumulatively, this 
practice had a substantial effect 
on interstate farm prices. Simi-
larly, in 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich, 
the Court held that Congress could 
regulate marijuana grown for 
home consumption as part of a 
general ban on controlled sub-
stances, because Congress reason-
ably concluded that people would 
substitute homegrown marijuana 
for other marijuana purchased 
in black markets.3 
The individual mandate taxes 
people who do not buy health 
insurance. Critics charge that 
these people are not engaged in 
any activity that Congress might 
regulate; they are simply doing 
nothing. This is not the case. Such 
people actually self-insure through 
various means. When uninsured 
people get sick, they rely on their 
families for financial support, go 
to emergency rooms (often pass-
ing costs on to others), or pur-
chase over-the-counter remedies. 
They substitute these activities for 
paying premiums to health in-
surance companies. All these ac-
tivities are economic, and they 
have a cumulative effect on in-
terstate commerce. Moreover, like 
people who substitute homegrown 
marijuana or wheat for purchased 
crops, the cumulative effect of 
uninsured people’s behavior un-
dermines Congress’s regulation 
— in this case, its regulation of 
health insurance markets. Because 
Congress believes that national 
health care reform won’t succeed 
unless these people are brought 
into national risk pools, it can 
regulate their activities in order 
to make its general regulation of 
health insurance effective.
One final argument against 
the individual mandate is that it 
violates the Fifth Amendment by 
allowing the government to take 
property without just compensa-
tion. “Takings” occur when the 
government seizes property from 
particular individuals; a familiar 
example is a local government’s 
taking of land by eminent do-
main. Ordinary income taxes and 
excise taxes that are levied on a 
large population and that regu-
late people’s behavior by taxing 
their income or consumption 
choices are not considered tak-
ings under the Constitution. The 
individual mandate is just such 
a tax — not a taking. 
Although opponents will chal-
lenge the individual mandate in 
court, constitutional challenges 
are unlikely to succeed. The Su-
preme Court will probably not even 
consider the issue unless a fed-
eral court of appeals strikes the 
tax down. In that unlikely event, 
the Supreme Court will almost 
certainly uphold the tax, at least 
if it follows existing law. To strike 
down the individual mandate, it 
would have to reject decades of 
precedents. It is very unlikely that 
there are five votes on the cur-
rent Court for staging such a con-
stitutional revolution.
Financial and other disclosures provided 
by the author are available with the full text 
of this article at NEJM.org.
From Yale Law School, New Haven, CT.
This article (10.1056/NEJMp1000087) was 
published on January 13, 2010, at NEJM 
.org.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).1. 
Hylton v. United States2. , 3 U.S. 171 
(1796).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).3. 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).4. 
Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society.
The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at YALE MEDICAL LIBRARY on October 26, 2013. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
